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CONFUSION IN MONTGOMERY’S WAKE: 
STATE RESPONSES, THE MANDATES OF 
MONTGOMERY, AND WHY A COMPLETE 
CATEGORICAL BAN ON LIFE WITHOUT 
PAROLE FOR JUVENILES IS THE ONLY 
CONSTITUTIONAL OPTION 
Alice Reichman Hoesterey* 
ABSTRACT 
In 2012, the United States Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama 
held that mandatory life without parole sentences for juvenile 
offenders are unconstitutional.  Several years later, the Court in 
Montgomery v. Louisiana determined that Miller must be applied 
retroactively.  However, Montgomery did more than decide the issue 
of retroactivity—it expanded Miller’s holding.  Following the decision 
in Montgomery, state courts have split over whether the decision 
requires additional protections for juveniles facing life without parole 
sentences.  This Article outlines the differing state responses to 
Montgomery, examining disagreements over when Montgomery’s 
protections are triggered and what procedural safeguards are 
required at sentencing.  It then proceeds to argue that Montgomery 
does in fact mandate additional procedures beyond what many states 
have implemented.  Montgomery is itself a groundbreaking decision 
that requires significant changes to current juvenile life without 
parole sentencing schemes.  Even if states implement the additional 
protections necessitated by Montgomery, the reasoning behind this, 
as well as prior opinions, make a categorical ban on life sentences 
without parole the only constitutional option for juveniles. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Since 2005, the United States Supreme Court has issued a series of 
decisions that have expanded the reach of Eighth Amendment 
protections and greatly narrowed the punishments available for 
juveniles convicted of serious offenses.  First, the Court held that 
capital punishment for all juvenile offenders is unconstitutional under 
the Eighth Amendment.1  Several years later, the Court held that a 
sentence of life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders 
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, and is thus 
unconstitutional.2  Then, in 2012, the Supreme Court in Miller v. 
Alabama3 held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits mandatory life 
without parole sentences for juveniles convicted of homicide.4  In so 
holding, the Court espoused the rule that “children are different” 
from adults and that courts must consider youth as a mitigating factor 
prior to imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders.5 
Following Miller, state courts were left to determine if the ruling 
applied retroactively to the over 2000 incarcerated persons6 serving 
mandatory life without parole sentences for crimes committed as 
juveniles.  State supreme courts split.  Some state courts found that 
the rule was procedural and consequently not retroactive.7  Other 
                                                                                                                             
 1. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005); see infra Section I.A. 
 2. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82 (2010); see infra Section I.A. 
 3. 567 U.S. 460 (2012). 
 4. Id. at 479. 
 5. Id. at 480. 
 6. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT 
PAROLE (JLWOP), at 17 (2010), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/jlwopchart.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/YFD5-2GTV] (reporting that 2574 juvenile offenders have been 
sentenced to life without parole, of which 2105 were sentenced as a mandatory 
sentence). 
 7. Fourteen states found Miller retroactive: Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, 
Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, and Wyoming. JOSH ROVNER, THE SENTENCING 
PROJECT, JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE: AN OVERVIEW 3 (2017), 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Juvenile-Life-Without-
Parole.pdf [https://perma.cc/5KQ8-XRCW].  Another six passed juvenile sentencing 
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state courts found that Miller was substantive, and therefore 
retroactive.8  As a result of the split, the United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in Montgomery v. Louisiana9 to determine whether 
Miller should apply retroactively.10 
The Montgomery Court found that Miller applied retroactively.11  
However, the Montgomery decision did far more.  The Court greatly 
expanded its more limited holding in Miller, concluding that life 
without parole is unconstitutionally excessive for the vast majority of 
juvenile homicide offenders.12  Montgomery makes clear that more is 
required of a sentencing court than mere consideration of the 
mitigating qualities of youth.13  However, many state sentencing 
schemes remain noncompliant with the increased sentencing 
requirements prescribed by Montgomery.14 
This Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I reviews the Supreme 
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence as it relates to juveniles, 
providing necessary background to the Montgomery decision.  Part I 
then proceeds to analyze the fundamental holdings of both Miller and 
Montgomery.  Part II examines state responses to Montgomery, 
outlining five key areas where state court decisions have split in terms 
of Montgomery’s requirements and application, and the reasons for 
the differing conclusions.  These responses are diagramed in further 
detail in the appendices.  Part III analyzes the fundamental holdings 
of Montgomery and argues that Montgomery established heightened 
sentencing requirements.  This Part evaluates the five areas of state 
discord, and explains how states should rule on these pressing 
questions.  Part IV demonstrates the deficiencies of the Montgomery 
decision, and ultimately argues that such shortcomings necessitate a 
complete categorical ban on life without parole for juvenile offenders. 
                                                                                                                             
legislation that applied retroactively: California, Delaware, Nebraska, Nevada, North 
Carolina, and Wyoming. Id. 
 8. Seven states concluded that Miller was not retroactive: Alabama, Colorado, 
Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, and Pennsylvania. Id. 
 9. 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016). 
 10. Id. at 725. 
 11. Id. at 734. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See infra Part III. 
 14. See infra Parts II and III. 
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I.  THE ROAD TO MONTGOMERY 
A. Roper and Graham: The Groundwork for Miller 
The Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Roper v. Simmons15 laid the 
groundwork for Miller and Montgomery by espousing the belief that 
children are constitutionality different from adults for the purposes of 
criminal sentencing.16  The Supreme Court held in Roper that a 
capital sentence for a juvenile defendant violates the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against “cruel and unusual punishment.”17  
Under the doctrine of proportionality, the Eighth Amendment not 
only prohibits abhorrent punishments, such as torture, but also 
forbids excessive punishments that are disproportionate to the crime 
committed.18  In Roper, the Court concluded that juveniles 
categorically differ from adults in terms of culpability, thus rendering 
a death sentence unconstitutionally excessive.19 
The Court cited three primary factors to support its conclusion that 
the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for juvenile 
offenders.20  First, the Roper Court noted that juveniles have a “lack 
of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility.”21  
Second, the Court explained that juveniles are more susceptible than 
adults to “negative influences and outside pressures.”22  Third, the 
Roper Court emphasized that the character and personality traits of 
juveniles are still developing and are “less fixed.”23  These factors led 
to the conclusion that juveniles have a diminished degree of moral 
culpability compared to adult offenders and a greater chance of 
successful reform.24  In light of these developmental differences, the 
Court determined that the rationales for imposing capital sentences 
on adults—deterrence and retribution—do not adequately justify 
                                                                                                                             
 15. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 16. Id. at 575. 
 17. Id. at 560–61, 568. 
 18. See id. at 560–65 (considering objective factors, including state legislative 
actions, jury decisions, international opinion, and opinion polls, as well as the Court’s 
independent judgment, to determine whether a punishment is grossly out of 
proportion to a crime). See generally Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002); Coker 
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).  For more on the Court’s Eighth Amendment 
proportionality doctrine, see generally Scott W. Howe, The Eighth Amendment as a 
Warrant Against Undeserved Punishment, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91 (2013). 
 19. See 543 U.S. at 575. 
 20. Id. at 569. 
 21. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367 (1993)). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 570. 
 24. Id. 
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imposing such sentences on minors.25  As a result, a death sentence 
for a minor is disproportionate and, thus, cruel and unusual under the 
Eighth Amendment. 
The Roper decision is significant in connection with Montgomery 
and Miller in two primary ways.  First, the Supreme Court based its 
holding in Roper largely on scientific studies showing that juveniles 
are biologically different from adults in ways that make them less 
culpable for their actions.26  These same scientific studies are cited in 
the Court’s subsequent decisions regarding the constitutionality of life 
without parole for juvenile offenders.27  The Court gave great weight 
to these studies and considered them to be an important factor in 
determining appropriate punishments for youths.28  Most notably, 
these very studies trusted by the Court support the assertion that it is 
impossible to determine when a juvenile is incorrigible.29 
Second, the Roper Court determined that even if a juvenile 
demonstrates a sufficient level of depravity to justify a death 
sentence, a case-by-case method of individualized sentencing for 
juveniles would still be insufficient.30  Individualized sentencing 
would pose too great a risk that the brutality of a crime would 
overpower the mitigation of youth, especially given that even 
juveniles who commit “heinous” crimes may be redeemable.31  
Further, it would likely be impossible for a sentencing court to 
differentiate such incorrigible juveniles from those whose crimes do 
not reflect permanent depravity, as even expert psychologists are 
unable to make such a determination.32  The Court thus determined 
that a categorical ban was required because a case-by-case approach 
would create an unacceptable risk that a juvenile offender would be 
given the death penalty despite insufficient culpability.33  This 
language emphasizing the difficulty of a case-by-case approach will 
                                                                                                                             
 25. See id. at 571–72. 
 26. Id. at 569. 
 27. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471–72 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 
48, 68, 72–73 (2010). 
 28. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 569–70. 
 29. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 735 (2016) (holding that only the 
rare incorrigible juvenile offender may be sentenced to life without parole); see infra 
Section III.A.  Thus, the scientific impossibility of identifying these few irredeemable 
juveniles is highly problematic for accurate implementation of the Court’s rule. See 
infra Section IV.A. 
 30. See 543 U.S. at 570, 572–73. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. at 573. 
 33. Id. at 572–73. 
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likely be relevant in future litigation addressing whether the 
Constitution requires a categorical bar on juvenile life without 
parole.34 
Five years after Roper, the Court in Graham v. Florida35 
considered the constitutionality of life in prison without parole for 
juvenile offenders who commit nonhomicide offenses.36  Until 
Graham, the Supreme Court was reluctant to apply the Eighth 
Amendment’s proportionality doctrine outside of the capital 
context.37  However, in Graham, the Court analogized the sentence of 
life without parole for juveniles to a capital sentence for adults.38  The 
Court explained that life without parole is the most severe sentence 
that a juvenile can receive and “guarantees [the juvenile] will die in 
prison without any meaningful opportunity to obtain release, no 
matter what he might do to demonstrate that the bad acts he 
committed as a teenager are not representative of his true 
character.”39 
As in Roper, the Graham Court developed a categorical rule 
prohibiting life without parole sentences for juvenile nonhomicide 
offenders.40  The Court cited the same concerns that motivated the 
invalidation of the death penalty for juveniles in the life without 
parole context.41  The Graham Court cited the precedent of Roper 
that a juvenile offender “is not as morally reprehensible” as an adult 
offender.42  The Court again cited “developments in psychology and 
brain science” as evidence of juveniles’ lessened moral culpability 
based on “fundamental differences between juvenile and adult 
minds.”43  The Court in Graham again doubted that a case-by-case 
approach could accurately distinguish the “few incorrigible juvenile 
offenders from the many that have the capacity for change.”44 
                                                                                                                             
 34. See infra Part IV. 
 35. 560 U.S. 48 (2010). 
 36. Id. at 52–53. 
 37. Id. at 102 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“For the first time in its history, the Court 
declares an entire class of offenders immune from a noncapital sentence using the 
categorical approach it previously reserved for death penalty cases alone.”); see also 
Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Opening a Window or Building a Wall? The 
Effect of Eighth Amendment Death Penalty Law and Advocacy on Criminal Justice 
More Broadly, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 175–90 (2008). 
 38. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 79 (2010). 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 82. 
 41. See id. at 66. 
 42. Id. at 68 (citing Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 835 (1988)). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 77. 
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B. Miller’s Holding 
Two years after Graham, the Court in Miller considered the case of 
two juvenile offenders convicted of homicide who were sentenced to 
life in prison without parole under a mandatory sentencing scheme.45  
The Court held that sentencing schemes that mandate life in prison 
without parole for juvenile offenders violate the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.46  The 
Court explained that Roper and Graham “establish[ed] that children 
are constitutionally different from adults for the purposes of 
sentencing”47 and, as such, it would contravene what we know about 
juvenile development to impose the most severe penalties on 
juveniles “as though they were not children.”48 
Although the Miller Court relied heavily on the reasoning set forth 
in Graham and Roper, unlike in those cases, the Court stopped short 
of issuing a categorical prohibition on life without parole for 
juveniles.49  Instead, the Court contemplated precedents in the capital 
context that elucidate the importance of individualized sentencing.50  
Specifically, the Court examined two capital cases: Woodson v. North 
Carolina51 and Eddings v. Oklahoma.52  Woodson invalidated a 
statute imposing a mandatory death penalty sentence because it failed 
to consider the character of the offender.53  Eddings held that the 
background and development of a juvenile defendant must be 
considered in assessing culpability in capital sentencing.54  
Analogizing to capital jurisprudence, the Miller Court stressed the 
importance of individualized sentencing for juveniles facing the most 
severe punishments.55 
Despite its holding that juveniles are entitled to individual 
sentencing prior to receiving a sentence of life without parole, the 
                                                                                                                             
 45. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 465 (2012). 
 46. See id. at 479. 
 47. Id. at 471. 
 48. Id. at 474. 
 49. See id. at 479 (“Because that holding is sufficient to decide these cases, we do 
not consider Jackson’s and Miller’s alternative argument that the Eighth Amendment 
requires a categorical bar on life without parole for juveniles.”). 
 50. See id. at 476. 
 51. 428 U.S. 280 (1976). 
 52. 455 U.S. 104 (1982). 
 53. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304. 
 54. See Eddings, 455 U.S. at 116.  This case was decided before Roper held that 
death sentences for juvenile offenders are unconstitutional. 
 55. Miller, 567 U.S. at 475. 
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Court provided little guidance on what this process would entail.56  
The Court identified five factors, often referred to as the “Miller 
factors,” that a court should consider during individualized 
sentencing.57  These five factors are: (1) “age and its hallmark 
features—among them, immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to 
appreciate risks”; (2) “family and home environment”; 
(3) circumstances of the offense; (4) legal competency, i.e. ability to 
deal with police and lawyers; and (5) “possibility of rehabilitation.”58  
However, nowhere does Miller state that these five factors must be 
considered.59  Instead, the only mandate is that a sentencer must 
“take into account how children are different, and how those 
differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime 
in prison.”60  What specific procedures to employ and what evidence 
to consider is left to the discretion of the states. 
After Miller, it was clear that states could no longer sentence 
juveniles to life without parole under a mandatory sentencing 
scheme.61  Furthermore, a sentencing court was now obligated to 
consider youth-related mitigating evidence prior to imposing a life 
without parole sentence.62  Even with its new mandates, the opinion 
left many questions regarding proper implementation unanswered, 
including retroactivity. 
C. Montgomery Expands Miller into a Categorical Rule 
The Supreme Court in Miller did not address whether states were 
required to apply the decision retroactively.  The legal principle for 
when to give retroactive effect to a new rule was established by the 
plurality decision in Teague v. Lane.63  The Teague decision 
established that new criminal procedure rules are generally not 
                                                                                                                             
 56. See id. at 480. 
 57. See id. at 477. 
 58. Id. at 477–78. 
 59. Many states have incorporated the Miller factors into new post-Miller 
legislation. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.1401(2) (West 2014); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 5/5-4.5-105 (West 2016); MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.033(2) (West 2016); NEB. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 28-105.02(2) (West 2017); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-1340.19B(c) 
(West 2012); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1102.1(d) (West 2012); WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.030(3)(b) (West 2015).  Additionally, some state supreme 
courts have mandated that sentencing courts consider the factors articulated in 
Miller. See, e.g., Aiken v. Byars, 765 S.E.2d 572, 577 (S.C. 2014); People v. Gutierrez, 
324 P.3d 245, 268 (Cal. 2014); Ex parte Henderson, 144 So. 3d 1262, 1284 (Ala. 2013). 
 60. Miller, 567 U.S. at 480 (emphasis added). 
 61. See id. at 489. 
 62. See id. at 480. 
 63. 489 U.S. 288, 310 (1989) (plurality opinion). 
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applied retroactively on collateral review, with two exceptions.64  
First, new rules of constitutional law must be applied retroactively if 
they are substantive.65  Substantive rules are those that forbid 
“criminal punishment of certain primary conduct,” and those that 
prohibit “a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants 
because of their status or offense.”66  Second, new procedural rules 
are given retroactive effect only if they are considered “watershed” 
rules of criminal procedure, meaning the new procedure implicates 
the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.67  
However, in the more than twenty-seven years since Teague was 
decided, the Supreme Court has never deemed a procedural rule to 
be “watershed.”68 
States were divided on whether the rule announced in Miller 
should apply retroactively.69  Several state supreme courts deemed 
Miller a procedural rule that did not rise to the level of a “watershed” 
rule.70  Therefore, these courts denied retroactive application of 
Miller.71  This interpretation found support in the text of Miller, 
which stated that the decision did not “categorically bar a penalty for 
a class of offenders or type of crime”72 and that instead Miller 
“mandates only that a sentencer follow a certain process.”73 
However, a larger number of states found Miller retroactive.74  
These states interpreted Miller as a substantive change in sentencing 
                                                                                                                             
 64. See id. at 311. 
 65. See id.; see also Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 329 (1989). 
 66. Penry, 492 U.S. at 330. 
 67. The Supreme Court usually cites to the pre-Teague case of Gideon v. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), as an example of a new rule that would be 
considered “watershed.” See Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (plurality opinion); see also 
Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495 (1990) (interpreting Teague).  For more on Teague 
and the “watershed” rule, see generally Ezra D. Landes, A New Approach to 
Overcoming the Insurmountable Watershed Rule Exception to Teague’s Collateral 
Review Killer, 74 MO. L. REV. 1 (2009). 
 68. Eighth Amendment—Retroactivity of New Constitutional Rules—Juvenile 
Sentencing—Montgomery v. Louisiana, 130 HARV. L. REV. 377, 383–84 (2016). 
 69. See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text. 
 70. See People v. Carp, 852 N.W.2d 801, 821 n.10 (Mich. 2014); State v. Tate, 
130 So. 3d 829, 841 (La. 2013); Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 330 (Minn. 2013); 
Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1, 9 (Pa. 2013). 
 71. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (plurality opinion). 
 72. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 483 (2012). 
 73. Id. (emphasis added). 
 74. See Falcon v. State, 162 So.3d 954, 961 (Fla. 2015); People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 
709, 722 (Ill. 2014); State v. Mantich, 842 N.W.2d 716, 731 (Neb. 2014); Jones v. State, 
122 So.3d 698, 702 (Miss. 2013); State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 115 (Iowa 2013); 
Diatchenko v. Dist. Att’y for Suffolk Dist., 1 N.E.3d 270, 281 (Mass. 2013). 
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statutes because the decision prohibited a type of punishment—
mandatory life without parole—for a class of defendants—juveniles.75  
These courts acknowledged that while Miller did have a procedural 
component, the procedural element was a direct result of the 
substantive change of law prohibiting mandatory life without parole 
sentences.76  Hence, these state courts concluded that, despite the 
Court’s statement that only a certain process must be followed, the 
holding was substantive.77  The Supreme Court granted review in 
Montgomery v. Louisiana to determine whether or not Miller should 
apply retroactively.78 
The Supreme Court in Montgomery sided with those state courts 
that found Miller substantive and retroactive, but for much different 
reasons.  Montgomery explained that Miller was substantive because 
it established that a life without parole sentence is unconstitutional 
for the “vast majority” of “juvenile offenders whose crimes reflect the 
transient immaturity of youth.”79  Acknowledging the procedural 
component in Miller, the Montgomery Court explained that the 
individualized sentencing procedure required by Miller was merely to 
“separate those juveniles who may be sentenced to life without parole 
from those who may not.”80  Thus, according to Montgomery, Miller 
did more than just invalidate mandatory life without parole 
sentencing schemes and require individualized sentencing.  Miller 
created a categorical rule, holding that “sentencing a child to life 
without parole is excessive for all but the rare juvenile offender whose 
crime reflects irreparable corruption.”81 
In dissent, Justice Scalia denounced the majority’s holding in 
Montgomery.82  He argued that, despite the majority’s claim to ban 
sentences of life without parole only in rare cases, the text of Miller 
“stated, quite clearly, precisely the opposite.”83  He criticized the 
majority, accusing it of “not applying Miller, but rewriting it.”84  
Justice Scalia pointed out that the Court made life without parole a 
“practical impossibility” because under Montgomery “even when the 
                                                                                                                             
 75. See generally cases cited supra note 74. 
 76. See generally cases cited supra note 74. 
 77. See generally cases cited supra note 74. 
 78. 136 S. Ct. 718, 725 (2016). 
 79. Id. at 734. 
 80. Id. at 735. 
 81. Id. at 724 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 82. See id. at 737, 743 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 83. Id. at 743 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 84. Id. 
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procedures that Miller demands are provided the constitutional 
requirement is not necessarily satisfied.”85  He then accused the 
majority of seeking a “devious way of eliminating life without parole 
for juvenile offenders.”86 
Justice Scalia’s claim that the majority restructured Miller’s holding 
finds support in the text of the two decisions, as the Montgomery 
opinion frequently runs contrary to Miller.  For example, while Miller 
claimed to require “only that a sentencer follow a certain process” 
before sentencing a juvenile to life without parole,87 Montgomery 
clarified that even if a court follows this exact process, the “sentence 
still violates the Eighth Amendment for a child” who is not 
incorrigible.88  Following a certain process cannot be the only 
requirement for constitutional sentencing if, after following the 
process, the sentence may still be unconstitutional.  Similarly, Miller 
expressly held that the opinion did “not categorically bar a penalty.”89  
However, in Montgomery the Court claimed that Miller did in fact 
categorically bar a sentence of life without parole for all juveniles 
except the “rarest” youth whose crime reflects “permanent 
incorrigibility.”90 
This conflicting language has led to confusion regarding what 
exactly Montgomery holds and what impact it should have on 
sentencing procedures.91  Although the express holding of 
Montgomery is that Miller is a substantive constitutional rule that 
must be given retroactive effect, the accompanying opinion goes 
significantly beyond the mere issue of retroactivity.92  Contradictory 
text and vague holdings have left state courts with the task of 
evaluating whether and to what extent Montgomery requires 
additional protections for juveniles facing life without parole.  
Predictably, state courts have split regarding several key issues 
presented in Miller and Montgomery.93 
                                                                                                                             
 85. Id. at 743–44 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 86. Id. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 87. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 483 (2012) (emphasis added). 
 88. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734. 
 89. Miller, 567 U.S. at 483. 
 90. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734. 
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II.  CONFLICTING STATE RESPONSES TO MONTGOMERY 
The failure of the Supreme Court to clearly articulate exactly how 
states must comply with this new substantive rule, as well as the 
prevalence of unclear and often conflicting language throughout the 
Montgomery opinion, has resulted in considerable splits among state 
courts over what is required for constitutional juvenile sentencing.  
Although state courts disagree on several major issues, the key 
distinctions stem from the degree to which a state court views 
Montgomery as a directive to establish broad protections for juvenile 
homicide offenders facing the possibility of life imprisonment.  While 
some states remain content to leave more discretion to a sentencing 
court, others view Montgomery as an obligation to provide additional 
protections for those juveniles. 
A. Procedural Protections Required at Sentencing Proceedings 
1.  Finding of Irreparable Corruption 
Miller and Montgomery clearly require a sentencing proceeding 
where youth is considered.94  However, states are split over what else, 
if anything, is required to make a sentencing proceeding 
constitutional.  One crucial disagreement among state courts is 
whether or not Montgomery mandates a sentencing court to make an 
express determination of “irreparable corruption”95 prior to 
sentencing juveniles to life without parole.  Many state courts have 
concluded that the clear language of Montgomery mandates such a 
finding.96  One such court was the Georgia Supreme Court.97  In 
Veal v. State, the court acknowledged that Montgomery changed the 
requirements for sentencing juveniles to life without parole.98  The 
                                                                                                                             
 94. See supra Section I.C. 
 95. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734. 
 96. See infra Figure 1 and Appendix B (detailing the differing conclusions of state 
courts); see also Landrum v. State, 192 So. 3d 459, 466 (Fla. 2016); Veal v. State, 784 
S.E.2d 403, 412 (Ga. 2016); Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410, 433 (Pa. 2017); 
People v. Nieto, 52 N.E.3d 442, 454–55 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016); Luna v. State, 387 P.3d 
956, 961 (Okla. Crim. App. 2016); People v. Hyatt, 891 N.W.2d 549, 555 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 2016); People v. Padilla, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 209, 215–16 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016), 
appeal docketed, 387 P.3d 741 (Cal. 2017).  Notably, Iowa required a finding of 
irreparable corruption after Miller but before Montgomery.  Iowa was the only state 
to require such a finding prior to Montgomery.  The court reasoned that because 
juveniles are less culpable and more capable of change, only those who are 
irreparable should suffer such a harsh sentence. See State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 
556–57 (Iowa 2015). 
 97. Veal, 784 S.E.2d at 411–12. 
 98. See id. at 410. 
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court stated that prior to Montgomery, the sentencing court had 
broad discretion to sentence a juvenile homicide offender to life 
without parole, so long as the court first contemplated the defendant’s 
youth.99  However, the Georgia Supreme Court then stated 
dramatically, in a stand-alone paragraph, “[b]ut then came 
Montgomery.”100  The Georgia court explained that Montgomery 
changed its prior understanding of Miller and made clear that 
sentencing a juvenile who is redeemable to life without parole is 
unconstitutional.101  In order to determine if life without parole is 
permissible, the court must determine whether the juvenile is one of 
the rare offenders for whom the sentence is permitted.102  This 
requires a “specific determination that he is irreparably corrupt.”103  
Without such a determination on the record, the sentence violates the 
Constitution.104 
Echoing Georgia, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated that, 
based on “competent evidence,” a sentencing court must conclude 
that a defendant “will forever be incorrigible, without any hope for 
rehabilitation.”105  Without such a finding, life without parole is 
“beyond the court’s power to impose.”106  Similarly, the Florida 
Supreme Court explained that failing to make the distinction between 
juveniles who are irreparably corrupt and those whose crimes reflect 
transient immaturity “would mean life sentences for juveniles would 
not be exceedingly rare, but possibly commonplace.”107  Other courts, 
including the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals,108 the highest 
court in Oklahoma for criminal matters, as well as lower appellate 
courts in Illinois,109 California,110 and Michigan,111 have reached the 
same conclusion. 
A smaller number of courts have held that Montgomery does not 
mandate a finding of irreparable corruption prior to imposing a 
                                                                                                                             
 99. See id. 
 100. Id. 
 101. See id. 
 102. See id. at 412. 
 103. Id. at 411. 
 104. Id. at 412. 
 105. Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410, 435 (Pa. 2017). 
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 107. Landrum v. State, 192 So. 3d 459, 466 (Fla. 2016). 
 108. See Luna v. State, 387 P.3d 956, 962 (Okla. Crim. App. 2016). 
 109. See People v. Nieto, 52 N.E.3d 442, 455 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016). 
 110. See People v. Padilla, 209 Cal. Rptr. 3d 209, 221 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). 
 111. See People v. Hyatt, 891 N.W.2d 549, 552 (Mich. Ct. App. 2016). 
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sentence of life without parole on a juvenile defendant.112  These 
courts, including the Washington Supreme Court113 and lower 
appellate courts in Tennessee,114 California,115 and Illinois,116 based 
their holdings largely on the following quote in Montgomery: “Miller 
did not require trial courts to make a finding of fact regarding a 
child’s incorrigibility.”117  Although the Washington Supreme Court 
acknowledged that Miller established a substantive rule—one that 
“draws a line” between children who are irredeemable and those who 
are immature—it found that no specific fact-finding was required to 
effectuate the substantive rule.118  Rather the court merely 
“encouraged” sentencing courts to “be as detailed and explicit as 
possible” at sentencing.119 
The Virginia Supreme Court in Jones v. Commonwealth also 
concluded that Montgomery does not require a finding of irreparable 
corruption.120  However, the Virginia court utilized a different 
approach than the above courts.  The Jones court claimed that 
Montgomery’s explicit language holding juvenile life without parole 
unconstitutional for all but the rarest incorrigible juvenile offenders is 
not binding on the Virginia court.121  The court alleged that they are 
bound only “by holdings, not language” and thus the binding 
precedent of Montgomery is limited solely to the “question” for 
decision in Montgomery: “whether Miller’s prohibition on mandatory 
life without parole for juvenile offenders’ should be applied 
retroactively.”122  Thus, the Virginia Supreme Court contends that 
“the precedential holding in Montgomery amounts simply to: Miller is 
retroactive.”123  Under such an interpretation, a finding of irreparable 
                                                                                                                             
 112. See infra Figure 1 and Appendix B (detailing the differing conclusions of state 
courts). 
 113. See State v. Ramos, 387 P.3d 650, 659 (Wash. 2017). 
 114. See Brown v. State, No. W2015-00887-CCA-R3-PC, 2016 WL 1562981, at *6 
(Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 15, 2016), appeal denied, Aug. 19, 2016, cert. denied, 
137 S. Ct. 1331 (2017). 
 115. See People v. Blackwell, 207 Cal. Rptr. 3d 444, 462 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016); 
People v. Willover, 203 Cal. Rptr. 3d 384, 395–96 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016). 
 116. See People v. Stafford, 61 N.E.3d 1058, 1068–69 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016); People v. 
Holman, 58 N.E.3d 632, 642–43 (Ill. App. Ct. 2016), appeal docketed, 60 N.E.3d 878 
(Ill. 2016). 
 117. Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 735 (2016). 
 118. See Ramos, 387 P.3d at 665. 
 119. Id. at 665–66. 
 120. See 795 S.E.2d 705, 709 (Va. 2017). 
 121. See id. at 721. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. at 724 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
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corruption is clearly not required, as the Virginia court does not 
consider life without parole unconstitutional for redeemable 
juveniles.124 
Of the states that have considered the question of whether a 
finding of incorrigibility is required, a greater number have found in 
the affirmative.125  However, this question has yet to be addressed by 
many state supreme courts, and legislators in those states have failed 
to pass legislation mandating such a finding.  Thus, a finding of 
irreparable corruption is not explicitly required in the majority of 
states that still allow for juvenile life without parole sentences. 
 
Figure 1. Irreparable Corruption Determination Required Prior to 
Imposing Life Without Parole (“LWOP”): State Supreme Court 
Interpretations  
1 The Iowa Supreme Court required a finding of irreparable corruption prior to Montgomery. 
2 The Tennessee decision was in the Court of Appeals, but the Tennessee Supreme Court denied review.  
2.  Presumption Against Life Without Parole 
An additional point of discord between states is whether Miller and 
Montgomery create a presumption against life without parole at 
sentencing.  Prior to Montgomery, five state supreme courts held that 
                                                                                                                             
 124. See id. at 709, 721. 
 125. See Appendix B. 
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Miller dictates a presumption against juvenile life without parole.126  
Relying on language in Miller that life sentences for juvenile 
homicide offenders should be “uncommon,” and that juveniles as a 
class are typically less culpable, the state supreme courts in 
Connecticut, Iowa, Utah, Missouri, and Indiana all held that there 
must be a presumption against imposing a life sentence without the 
opportunity for parole.127 
Following Montgomery, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in 
Commonwealth v. Batts came to the same conclusion, holding that 
there must be a presumption against life without parole, and a 
juvenile can only receive such a sentence if the state can prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile cannot ever be 
rehabilitated.128  In reaching this conclusion, the Batts majority 
emphasized that such sentences are supposed to be “rare” and limited 
to “exceptional circumstances.”129  Additionally, because the “vast 
majority of adolescents change,” it should be presumed that a juvenile 
is part of that vast majority.130 
However, not all states have taken this approach.  The Nebraska 
Supreme Court held that a presumption against life without parole 
was “not required by the U.S. Supreme Court . . . and we will not 
create one.”131  As such, there is no presumption in favor of either 
sentence.132  The California Supreme Court, after Miller but before 
Montgomery, failed to establish a presumption in favor of release, 
despite holding that a presumption in favor of life without parole 
“would raise a serious constitutional question under Miller.”133  
However, the California Supreme Court has recently granted review 
of this issue, to determine if, post-Montgomery, there is now a 
presumption in favor of an opportunity for release.134 
                                                                                                                             
 126. See Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410, 416 (Pa. 2017); State v. Riley, 110 
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 129. Id. at 452. 
 130. Id. 
 131. State v. Mantich, 888 N.W.2d 376, 384 (Neb. 2016). 
 132. See id. 
 133. People v. Gutierrez, 324 P.3d 245, 263 (Cal. 2014). 
 134. See News Release, Sup. Ct. of Cal., Summary of Cases Accepted and Related 
Actions During Week of January 23, 2017 (Jan. 27, 2017), www.courts.ca.gov/
documents/ws012317.pdf [https://perma.cc/859S-EB4D] (providing statement of the 
issue in People v. Arzate, No. B259259, 2016 WL 5462821, at*1 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 
29, 2016)).  However, the California legislature recently passed legislation that 
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Other states have upheld sentencing schemes that presume a 
sentence of life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders, 
leaving defendants to prove they are part of the constitutionally 
protected class for whom such a punishment is excessive.  The 
Supreme Court of Washington recently upheld a sentencing scheme 
that makes life without parole the presumptive sentence and places 
“the burden on the juvenile offender to prove an exceptional 
sentence is justified.”135  The Washington court reasoned that placing 
the burden of proof on the juvenile defendant to prove that he should 
receive an “exceptional” sentence below the default does not run 
afoul of Miller because the Supreme Court did not create such a clear 
procedure.136  Likewise, both the Arizona and Virginia Supreme 
Courts place the burden on juvenile defendants to show that they are 
ineligible for a life without parole sentence.137 
 
Figure 2. Presumption Against Life Without Parole: State Supreme 
Court Interpretations138 
                                                                                                                             
effectively ends juvenile life without parole in California, as it mandates parole 
hearings after twenty-five years of incarceration for all juveniles serving life without 
parole sentences. See S.B. 394, 2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).  It is unclear if the 
California Supreme Court will still consider this issue, or if the court will instead 
consider the issue moot due to the legislative action. 
 135. State v. Ramos, 387 P.3d 650, 659 (Wash. 2017). 
 136. See id. at 663. 
 137. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 795 S.E.2d 705, 726 (Va. 2017) (Powell, J., 
dissenting); State v. Valencia, 386 P.3d 392, 396 (Ariz. 2016). 
 138. For additional information, see Appendix E. 
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B. When the Protections of Miller and Montgomery Are Triggered 
1.  Application to Discretionary Life Without Parole Sentences 
There is disagreement among state courts regarding what types of 
sentences trigger the protections of Miller and Montgomery.  One 
such division concerns whether Miller and Montgomery’s protections 
apply only to juveniles sentenced under mandatory sentencing 
statutes, or if such protections also apply to juveniles sentenced to life 
without parole under discretionary sentencing schemes.139 
Even before Montgomery’s expansion of Miller, several state 
supreme courts held Miller applicable to both mandatory and 
discretionary life without parole sentences.140  The South Carolina 
Supreme Court, for example, in holding Miller applicable to non-
mandatory life without parole sentences, explained that “Miller does 
more than ban mandatory life sentencing schemes for juveniles; it 
establishes an affirmative requirement that courts fully explore the 
impact of the defendant’s juvenility on the sentence rendered.”141  
Similarly, other states noted that Miller requires a sentencing court to 
actually consider the defendant’s youth prior to imposing life without 
parole—just allowing discretion is inadequate.142  However, other 
state courts concluded that the requirements of Miller are triggered 
only by mandatory life without parole sentences, as evidenced by the 
repeated use of the word “mandatory” in the Miller decision.143 
Following Montgomery, some states reversed their earlier position, 
instead holding that Montgomery’s clarification of Miller illustrates 
that the protections of Miller apply to discretionary sentences as well.  
The Georgia Supreme Court reversed its prior holding,144 explaining 
that its earlier understanding of Miller was incorrect.145  The Georgia 
court held that Miller, as interpreted by Montgomery, is applicable to 
                                                                                                                             
 139. See Appendix C. 
 140. See, e.g., State v. Riley, 110 A.3d 1205, 1213 (Conn. 2015); Aiken v. Byars, 765 
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 144. See Foster, 754 S.E.2d at 37. 
 145. See Veal v. State, 784 S.E.2d 403, 410 (Ga. 2016). 
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discretionary sentences.146  Similarly, the Arizona Supreme Court, 
which initially refused review on the appellate court decisions finding 
Miller applicable only to mandatory sentences,147 authored an 
opinion post-Montgomery holding Miller’s protections pertinent to 
discretionary sentences.148  This decision came after the United States 
Supreme Court vacated and remanded a series of Arizona cases for 
reconsideration in light of Montgomery.149  One such case was 
Purcell v. Arizona, in which the sentencing court did in fact consider 
the defendant’s youth at sentencing as a statutory mitigating factor.150  
Additionally, other states including Florida,151 Washington,152 and 
Oklahoma153 determined, with the guidance of Montgomery, that 
Miller’s protections are not limited to mandatorily imposed life 
without parole sentences. 
Despite the clear trend towards finding Miller applicable to 
discretionary sentences of life without parole, such a finding is not 
universal.  The United States Supreme Court recently remanded 
Jones v. Virginia, a life without parole case, back to the Virginia 
Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of Montgomery.154  In this 
case, the juvenile defendant took a plea deal for life without parole in 
order to avoid a death sentence (as he was convicted prior to 
Roper).155  As a result of the plea, the sentencing court never 
considered youth or its mitigating circumstances at sentencing.156  
Upon reconsideration, the Virginia Supreme Court maintained that 
Miller and Montgomery apply only to punishments imposed under a 
mandatory life without parole sentencing statute.157  The Virginia 
court claimed that because the defendant was sentenced under a 
statute that allowed for the opportunity to present mitigating 
evidence, Jones’s sentence was not unconstitutional.158  According to 
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the majority, because Jones was not denied the right to present 
mitigation, but instead opted not to utilize the right, Montgomery and 
Miller do not apply.159  Additionally, the Missouri Supreme Court 
recently held that “once mandatory life in prison without the 
possibility of parole was off the table,” Miller no longer had any 
application to the defendant’s murder conviction.160 
2.  De Facto Life Without Parole Sentences 
States also split as to whether Miller and Montgomery apply only 
to sentences labeled “life without parole,” or if their protections are 
triggered by any lengthy sentence, including aggregate sentences 
imposed for multiple convictions, that denies a defendant a 
“meaningful opportunity to obtain release.”161  On the one hand, 
several state supreme courts have held lengthy prison terms as “de 
facto” life without parole sentences, requiring individualized 
sentencing as mandated by Miller.162  The Supreme Court of 
Washington recently held that Miller applied to a juvenile defendant’s 
eighty-five year sentence, concluding that Miller “clearly . . . applies 
to any juvenile homicide offender who might be sentenced to die in 
prison without a meaningful opportunity to gain early release based 
on demonstrated rehabilitation.”163  The Supreme Court of Illinois 
concluded that a mandatory aggregate sentence of ninety-seven years 
imprisonment amounted to a de facto life without parole sentence 
because the juvenile “defendant will most certainly not live long 
enough to ever become eligible for release.”164  Similarly, the Indiana 
Supreme Court noted that a lengthy sentence of 150 years “forswears 
                                                                                                                             
 159. See id. 
 160. State v. Nathan, 522 S.W.3d 881, 891 (Mo. 2017). 
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 162. See Appendix D. 
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altogether the rehabilitative ideal” of Miller.165  The majority of state 
courts that have considered this issue focus on whether or not a 
juvenile actually has an opportunity for release, rather than the exact 
label of the sentence, and find Miller applicable to de facto 
sentences.166 
However, among states that read Miller as applicable to lengthy 
sentences, there is a significant discrepancy over how long a sentence 
must be to prompt Miller protections.  On the low end, the Supreme 
Court of Wyoming held that an aggregate term of forty-five years was 
a de facto sentence of life without parole and implicated Miller.167  
However, some states that replaced their mandatory life without 
parole sentencing statute created mandatory minimum sentences of a 
similar length.  For example, juveniles convicted of capital murder in 
both Florida and Nebraska must be sentenced to a minimum of forty 
years imprisonment.168 
On the other hand, several states have held that a sentence must be 
explicitly labeled as “life without parole” to trigger the Court’s Eighth 
Amendment protections.169  The Nebraska Supreme Court concluded 
that a sentence with the possibility of parole, however remote, does 
not trigger Miller, stating that the defendant’s “characterization of his 
sentence [of ninety years] as a de facto life sentence is immaterial” to 
the analysis.170  The Missouri Supreme Court in State v. Nathan 
similarly held that Miller does not apply to consecutive sentences that 
together amount to the “functional equivalent” of life without 
parole.171  In Nathan the defendant was granted a resentencing 
hearing following Miller for his first-degree murder conviction.172  At 
resentencing the jury failed to find Nathan irreparably corrupt, 
leading the court to vacate his first-degree murder conviction and 
resentence him to life with the possibility of parole for that 
conviction.173  However, Nathan was convicted of other crimes 
associated with a home-invasion robbery and murder, including 
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 173. See id. at 896. 
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burglary, kidnapping, assault, and armed criminal action.174  Despite 
finding Nathan ineligible for life without parole, the court ordered all 
the sentences to run consecutively—giving Nathan a sentence of 300 
years in prison.175  The court held that Miller does “not address the 
constitutional validity of consecutive sentences, let alone the 
cumulative effect of such sentences,” and thus Nathan’s sentence did 
not violate Miller.176 
3.  Criminal Offenses Eligible for Life Without Parole 
State legislatures have also taken different approaches towards 
determining what crimes should be eligible for life without parole.  
Most states only allow life without parole sentences for minors 
convicted of first-degree murder, rather than lesser homicide 
offenses.177  However, this is not the case in all states.  In Louisiana, 
juveniles convicted of first-degree or second-degree murder remain 
eligible to receive a life without parole sentence.178  Second-degree 
murder includes offenders who had “intent to kill or to inflict great 
bodily harm” and death by unlawful distribution of a controlled 
substance.179  Notably, only adults convicted of first-degree murder 
are eligible for the death penalty in Louisiana.180  This means minors 
are eligible for life without parole for a greater number of offenses 
than adults are eligible for the death penalty, despite both sentences 
being reserved for only the most morally culpable homicide 
defendants. 
Other states have narrowed the eligible offenses prospectively, but 
maintain life without parole as a possible sentence for second-degree 
murder in re-sentencing hearings mandated under Montgomery’s 
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retroactivity holding.  For example, Pennsylvania revised its juvenile 
sentencing statute and no longer allows life without parole sentences 
for juveniles convicted of second-degree murder.181  This is in line 
with Pennsylvania’s death penalty sentencing scheme.182  However, 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the new sentencing statute 
“applies only to minors convicted of murder on and after the date 
Miller was issued . . . .”183 
Other states have modeled their juvenile life without parole 
sentencing statutes on death penalty statutes, reasoning that both 
punishments are reserved for the worst offenders.  For example, 
Missouri has not only narrowed the class of juveniles eligible to those 
convicted of first-degree murder, but has required a finding of an 
aggravating factor prior to eligibility for such a sentence, much like 
that which is required to sentence an adult to death.184  Thus, the 
criminal offenses for which a juvenile may receive life without parole, 
although limited to homicide by Graham, still vary by state. 
III.  THE CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATES OF MONTGOMERY 
Montgomery requires states to do more to protect juveniles from 
excessive sentences.  Part III examines the requirements of 
Montgomery, and argues how states should change their current 
sentencing practices to comply with Montgomery’s mandates. 
A. Courts Must Make a Determination of “Irreparable Corruption” 
Prior to Sentencing a Juvenile to Life Without Parole 
Montgomery made clear that mere consideration of youth is not 
enough to render a sentence of life without parole constitutional; the 
Eighth Amendment requires more.185  Specifically, a sentencing court 
must determine that a youth is irreparably corrupt or permanently 
incorrigible prior to imposing a sentence of life without parole.186 
The importance of making such a finding is repeatedly emphasized 
throughout the text of Montgomery.  The Court held life without 
parole “excessive for all but ‘the rare juvenile offender whose crime 
                                                                                                                             
 181. 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1102.1 (West 2017). 
 182. 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1102 (West 2017). 
 183. Commonwealth v. Batts, 66 A.3d 286, 293 (Pa. 2013). 
 184. MO. ANN. STAT. § 565.034 (West 2017). 
 185. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 734 (2016) (citing Miller v. 
Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 472–73 (2012)) (“Miller, then, did more than require a 
sentencer to consider a juvenile offender’s youth before imposing life without 
parole . . . .”). 
 186. See id. 
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reflects irreparable corruption’ . . . .”187  The Court again stated that, 
“Miller did bar life without parole . . . for all but the rarest of juvenile 
offenders, those whose crimes reflect permanent incorrigibility.”188  In 
fact, the majority mentions eight times in the opinion that only 
irreparably corrupt juveniles may constitutionally receive sentences of 
life without parole.189  Because life without parole is an excessive 
punishment for juveniles whose crimes reflect “transient 
immaturity,”190 a sentencer must determine whether a juvenile is 
irreparably corrupt and thus one of the rare juveniles for whom a 
sentence of life without parole is constitutional. 
Despite this repetitive language, several states have determined no 
such finding is required.191  These holdings rest on one line in 
Montgomery that states that no formal fact-finding is required.192  
However, when considering the overall language of the Montgomery 
opinion, it is clear that this sentence should not be considered the 
controlling rule.  The majority mentions just once that there is no 
formal fact-finding required—far fewer than the eight times the Court 
mentions that only irredeemable youth may be sentenced to life 
                                                                                                                             
 187. Id. at 724 (citing Miller, 567 U.S. at 479). 
 188. Id. at 734. 
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irreparable corruption.”) (emphasis added); id. at 735 (“Miller’s substantive holding 
that life without parole is an excessive sentence for children whose crimes reflect 
transient immaturity.”) (emphasis added); id. (“That Miller did not impose a formal 
factfinding requirement does not leave States free to sentence a child whose crime 
reflects transient immaturity to life without parole.”) (emphasis added); id. at 736 
(“[P]risoners like Montgomery must be given the opportunity to show their crime did 
not reflect irreparable corruption . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 190. Id. at 734. 
 191. See supra Section II.A. 
 192. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735. 
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without parole.193  Markedly, the Court follows the assertion that 
there is no required finding of fact with the following statement: 
“[t]hat Miller did not impose a formal factfinding requirement does 
not leave States free to sentence a child whose crime reflects transient 
immaturity to life without parole.”194  Because a state is not free to 
sentence a juvenile whose crime reflects transient immaturity to life 
without parole, a sentencer must determine that a juvenile does not 
fall in that protected class.  Without making such a determination, 
there is a substantial risk that the state has sentenced a child whose 
crime reflects transient immaturity to a constitutionally excessive 
sentence.  The lack of a “formal factfinding requirement” noted in the 
opinion is thus better read as the Court failing to tell the states exactly 
how they make this determination.  Nonetheless, the determination 
must still be made. 
Additional evidence that Montgomery requires a finding of 
irreparable corruption comes from interpretations of Montgomery 
written by members of the Supreme Court.  Justice Scalia, who was 
joined in dissent by Justices Thomas and Alito, read Montgomery as 
establishing an “‘incorrigibility’ requirement.”195  Additional evidence 
also comes from more recent Supreme Court decisions.  In Adams v. 
Alabama,196 a decision to vacate and remand for reconsideration in 
light of Montgomery, Justice Sotomayor, joined by Justice Ginsburg, 
noted that there was “no indication” that the factfinders “asked the 
question Miller required them not only to answer, but to answer 
correctly: whether petitioners’ crimes reflected ‘transient immaturity’ 
or ‘irreparable corruption.’”197  Five justices, outside the language of 
the Montgomery majority opinion, have thus stated their belief that 
Montgomery requires a determination of irreparable corruption prior 
to a life without parole sentence.198 
The Supreme Court has clearly established that under the Eighth 
Amendment the sentence of life without parole is disproportionate 
for juveniles whose crimes reflect transient immaturity, rather than 
irreparable corruption.  Sentencing courts, after giving mitigating 
effect to the characteristics and circumstances of youth, must 
determine whether a juvenile is irreparably corrupt.  A sentence of 
life without parole for a child who is not found to be irreparably 
                                                                                                                             
 193. See discussion supra note 189. 
 194. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 735 (emphasis added). 
 195. Id. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 196. 136 S. Ct. 1796 (2016). 
 197. Id. at 1800 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 198. See id.; see also Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
2017] CONFUSION IN MONTGOMERY'S WAKE 175 
corrupt is void.  However, the vast majority of states that continue to 
have life without parole sentences available for juveniles have failed 
to require a finding of irreparable corruption by the sentencer. 
B. A Possibility of Release Must Be the Presumptive Sentence 
To comply with Miller and Montgomery, states must create a 
presumption against life without parole sentences for juvenile 
offenders.  The burden must be on the state to rebut this presumption 
by showing that the juvenile defendant is one of the rare juvenile 
offenders whose crime reflects permanent incorrigibility.  A failure to 
create such a presumption and corresponding burden ignores the 
fundamental holdings of Miller and Montgomery and will necessarily 
result in unconstitutional sentencing. 
The Court in Montgomery made clear that sentences of life without 
parole for juveniles should be extraordinarily rare.199  The use of the 
word “rare” was not just dicta, but was used with intention, as 
evidenced by consistent repetition throughout the opinion.200  The 
Court stressed how rare such sentences should be by noting six 
separate times that life without parole is only constitutional for the 
“rare” juvenile.201  The Court states an additional two times that life 
without parole is unconstitutional for the “vast majority” of juvenile 
homicide defendants.202  The Court makes abundantly clear that such 
a sentence should only be issued in “exceptional circumstances.”203  
Intuition tells us that if an outcome is exceptionally rare, it should not 
be presumed.  However, states across the nation are ignoring this 
fundamental principle by failing to create a presumption against life 
                                                                                                                             
 199. See discussion infra note 197. 
 200. See discussion infra note 197. 
 201. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 726 (“ . . . the Court explained that a lifetime in 
prison is a disproportionate sentence for all but the rarest of children, those whose 
crimes reflect “‘irreparable corruption.’”) (emphasis added); id. at 733 (“The Court 
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 202. Id. at 734, 736. 
 203. Id. at 736. 
176 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLV 
without parole for juveniles.204  This violates the Court’s mandate that 
such sentences be rare. 
Additionally, failing to presume that a juvenile is redeemable 
violates the core principles upon which Miller and Montgomery 
rest—that children are developmentally different and must be treated 
differently from adults.205  Montgomery plainly established that life 
without parole is unconstitutional for juvenile offenders whose crimes 
reflect “transient immaturity.”206  However, both immaturity and its 
transient nature are central features of adolescent brain development, 
present in all juvenile offenders.207  Both Miller and Montgomery, 
discussing Graham, acknowledged that juveniles characteristically 
lack maturity and impulse control, as the “parts of the brain involved 
in behavior control” have not fully matured.208  Additionally, the 
Montgomery Court recognized that a child’s “traits are ‘less fixed’ 
and his actions less likely to be evidence of ‘irretrievable 
depravity.’”209  These traits of transient immaturity, characteristic of 
all juveniles, led the Court to conclude that juveniles are less culpable 
and in need of greater constitutional protection.210  Presuming that a 
juvenile offender’s crime was not the result of transient immaturity 
contradicts the science on which the Roper, Graham, Miller, and 
Montgomery cases rest. 
Having life without parole as the presumptive sentence for juvenile 
homicide offenders, or failing to have any presumption at all, places 
the responsibility of proving transient immaturity on the juvenile 
defendants themselves.  This is highly problematic as juveniles are in 
an exceptionally poor position, due to qualities inherent in youth, to 
undertake such an important and difficult task.211  The Court 
acknowledged in Graham, and reiterated in Miller, that the “features 
                                                                                                                             
 204. See supra Part II. 
 205. See, e.g., Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 736; Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 479 
(2012). 
 206. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 734. 
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 209. Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 733 (quoting Miller, 567 U.S. at 461). 
 210. See supra Part II (explaining the reasoning in Miller and Montgomery). 
 211. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 78 (2010); see also Brief for NAACP 
Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. et al., Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 7–24, 
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(1997). 
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that distinguish juveniles from adults also put them at a significant 
disadvantage in criminal proceedings.”212  This results in, as the 
Supreme Court stated, the juvenile’s unique “incapacity to assist his 
own attorneys.”213  Placing responsibility on juveniles, who by their 
very nature are impulsive and immature, to prove an issue of 
constitutionality is irresponsible at best. 
Furthermore, requiring a juvenile to prove that he can be 
rehabilitated is especially questionable considering the known 
difficulty of making such a determination.  The Court has repeatedly 
recognized the “great difficulty . . . of distinguishing at this early age 
between ‘the juvenile offender . . . ’” who is irreparable and the 
juvenile offender who is redeemable.214  Even expert psychologists 
have difficulty identifying those juveniles whose crimes reflect 
transient immaturity.215  It is objectionable to require a juvenile to 
prove a fact that even experts cannot reliably show.  Placing the 
burden on a juvenile to show that he can be rehabilitated creates an 
unacceptably high risk that he will be unconstitutionally sentenced to 
life without parole. 
In order to effectuate the Court’s mandate that only the rare 
irreparably corrupt youthful offender receive a sentence of life 
without parole, a state must create a presumption against life without 
parole.  Anything else would undermine the Court’s ruling that such 
sentences be reserved for the rare incorrigible juvenile. 
C. Both Mandatory and Discretionary Life Without Parole 
Sentences Must Comply with Montgomery and Miller 
Montgomery makes explicit that the protections it affords to child 
defendants apply whenever a juvenile is sentenced to life without 
parole, regardless of whether the juvenile is sentenced under a 
mandatory or discretionary sentencing statute.  Montgomery outright 
requires courts to consider age-related mitigating evidence prior to 
sentencing a juvenile to life without parole.216  If a sentencing judge is 
merely allowed to consider evidence of youth under a discretionary 
scheme but either fails to do so or does not afford the evidence the 
proper mitigating weight, the sentence would automatically violate 
                                                                                                                             
 212. Graham, 560 U.S. at 78; Miller, 567 U.S. at 478 (quoting Graham, 560 U.S. at 
78). 
 213. Miller, 567 U.S. at 478. 
 214. Id. at 479 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 573 (2005)). 
 215. See Graham, 560 U.S. at 68; Roper, 543 U.S. at 573. 
 216. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 733 (2016). 
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Miller and Montgomery.217  Although the Virginia Supreme Court 
attempted to say that only an “opportunity” to present evidence is 
required,218 this is plainly in conflict with the Supreme Court’s 
repeated statements that comprehensive examination of youth is 
obligatory for constitutional sentencing.219 
Furthermore, even discretionary sentences issued after the full 
exploration of youth-based mitigation can violate Montgomery.  The 
Court specifically stated that life without parole sentences issued after 
the contemplation of the defendant’s youth could still run afoul of the 
Constitution.220  Given that mitigating evidence can only be 
considered under a discretionary sentencing statute, the Court clearly 
did not limit its holding only to mandatory sentences.  Additionally, 
the Court says that Miller is not a procedural decision, meaning the 
holding is not simply that sentencing courts must allow for 
discretion.221 
Further evidence that the Supreme Court intended Montgomery to 
apply to discretionary sentences comes from the series of Arizona 
cases that were vacated and remanded.222  In these cases, the minor 
defendants were sentenced under a discretionary sentencing 
statute.223  The Supreme Court, in deciding to remand these cases for 
reconsideration in light of Montgomery, made clear its belief that 
Montgomery applies even to discretionary sentences.224 
Thus, to comply with Montgomery, a state must apply 
Montgomery’s mandates to all juvenile defendants facing life without 
parole sentences, not just those sentenced under a mandatory statute. 
D. Montgomery Applies to Lengthy Sentences that Are the 
Equivalent to Life Without Parole 
Miller and Montgomery placed constitutional limits on the type of 
sentences that are allowable for children.  The Court reasoned that 
the decreased culpability of children means that incredibly few 
                                                                                                                             
 217. See id. at 734. 
 218. See Jones v. Commonwealth, 795 S.E.2d 705, 711 (Va. 2017); see also supra 
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deserve to spend their lives in prison, with no opportunity to 
demonstrate redemption.225  The Court’s judgment that children 
should not spend their entire lives incarcerated unless they are truly 
incorrigible applies whenever a child faces a lifetime behind bars, 
regardless of whether the sentence is technically labeled “life without 
parole.”  It would violate the principles of Miller and Montgomery to 
hold that a youthful offender may be sentenced to a lifetime of 
incarceration without the procedural and substantive protections 
required by the Court, simply because the sentence is different in 
name only.226  An offender who is sentenced to a lengthy term of 
years should not be worse off than an offender who was sentenced to 
life without parole. 
Miller’s protections should not only be activated when the term of 
years exceeds the predicted life span of the offender, such as a 
sentence of 200 years.  In Graham, the Supreme Court held that 
children convicted of nonhomicide offenses cannot be sentenced to 
life without parole and that they must instead have a “realistic” and 
“meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated 
maturity and rehabilitation.”227  Graham thus established that youth 
who are ineligible for life without parole must have a “meaningful 
opportunity” for release.228  Therefore, juvenile homicide offenders 
who may not be sentenced to life imprisonment must too have such a 
chance.  Thus, the possibility of geriatric release, when the youth has 
spent over half a century behind bars, cannot be considered a 
meaningful opportunity.  Attempts to circumvent Miller’s holding 
through lengthy sentences should be overturned. 
E. States Should Narrow the Juvenile Offenses Eligible for Life 
Without Parole 
In Miller and Montgomery, the Court analogized the sentence of 
life without parole for minors to the sentence of death for adults.229  
The Supreme Court repeatedly cited landmark Eighth Amendment 
death penalty cases, suggesting that the Court’s death penalty cases 
                                                                                                                             
 225. See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 733. 
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 227. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 75, 82 (2010). 
 228. Id. at 75. 
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are highly relevant for the discussion of juvenile life without parole.230  
The fundamental holding of much of the death penalty jurisprudence 
is that the sentence must be reserved for the “worst of the worst” 
offenders.231  Much like death is reserved for the worst adult homicide 
offenders, life without parole is reserved for the worst juvenile 
homicide offenders.232  Given that both punishments are reserved for 
the most culpable, it would stand to reason that states would make 
the offenses for which adults can receive the death penalty the same 
as the offenses for which juveniles can receive life without parole.  
However, as outlined above, not all states have unified such 
offenses.233 
Additionally, in death penalty law, the Supreme Court requires 
state death penalty statutes to “narrow[ ] the categories of murders 
for which a death sentence may ever be imposed.”234  Although not 
binding precedent for juvenile cases, as it applies only in the death 
penalty context, the death penalty narrowing requirement gives clear 
guidance on what states should require in order to differentiate the 
“rare” juvenile offender who represents the worst of the worst.  In 
addition to only making juveniles convicted of first-degree or capital 
murder eligible for life without parole, there should be some means to 
further identify the rare juvenile whose crime reflects irreparable 
corruption.  Although it is questionable how well aggravating 
circumstances actually constrain eligibility,235 it is one way to ensure 
there is at least some narrowing of individuals eligible for the worst 
punishments. 
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IV.  MONTGOMERY  CONTAINS THE SEEDS FOR THE END OF 
JUVENILE LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE 
A. Montgomery’s Deficiencies 
1. It Is Scientifically Impossible to Reliably Identify Irreparably 
Corrupt Juveniles 
Montgomery’s holding that life without parole is only justified for 
the irreparably corrupt offender is complicated by one significant 
factor: it is impossible to tell with any certainty which juveniles fall 
into this category.  The Court in Graham acknowledged this fact, 
stating that, “juvenile offenders cannot with reliability be classified 
among the worst offenders.”236  This is because the science of 
adolescent brain development,237 on which the Court based its 
conclusion that “children are different,” plainly states that making an 
accurate determination about a juvenile’s permanent character is 
impossible.238 
The American Psychological Association (“APA”), in an amicus 
brief filed in Miller, stated that, “there is no reliable way to determine 
that a juvenile’s offenses are the result of an irredeemably corrupt 
character.”239  The APA noted that early predictors for adult 
psychopathy are strongly lacking.  For example, “[o]ne study found 
that only 16 percent of young adolescents who scored in the top 
quintile of a juvenile psychopathy measure would eventually be 
assessed as psychopathic at age 24.”240   Another study showed “no 
correlation between a youthful homicide offense and the basic 
psychological measures of persistent antisocial personality.”241 
Similarly, the article “Guilty by Reason of Adolescence,” which is 
cited five times by the Court in Roper, explains that science 
“currently lack(s) the diagnostic tools to evaluate psychosocial 
immaturity reliably on an individualized basis or to distinguish young 
career criminals from ordinary adolescents who will repudiate their 
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reckless experimentation as adults.”242  The article further explained 
that permanent labels regarding a youth’s ability to change are 
“difficult to defend as applied to individuals whose identity 
development is still under way.”243  Furthermore, any attempts to 
litigate the question of “maturity on a case-by-case basis is likely to be 
an error-prone undertaking.”244 
Scientists make clear that any determination about a juvenile’s 
permanent character is completely inconsistent with the science on 
which Miller rests.  As the Iowa Supreme Court rightly observed, 
Montgomery’s directive to sentencing courts to separate the 
incorrigible from the immature asks courts to “do the impossible, 
namely, to determine whether the offender is ‘irretrievably corrupt’ at 
a time when even trained professionals with years of clinical 
experience would not attempt to make such a determination.”245 
2. Sentences Will Be Arbitrary 
Neither Miller nor Montgomery defines what evidence would 
support a finding of irreparable corruption nor does either decision 
provide guidelines for identifying the exceptionally rare juvenile who 
is eligible for life without parole.  The Court made clear that the 
heinousness of the crime cannot by itself be offered as evidence of an 
irreparably corrupt youth, because even youth who commit horrific 
crimes “are capable of change.”246  The crime for which the juvenile is 
being sentenced is likely the worst thing that he or she has done in 
life.  If a brutal murder is not enough to declare a youth 
“irreparable,” what is? 
The Court fails to provide an answer to this question.  Miller 
mandates a procedural hearing where the court considers the several 
factors, known as the “Miller factors,” in order to distinguish the 
irreparable from the transiently immature.247  But without instruction 
on how to interpret such factors, courts are unable to apply them 
consistently in any fair way.  For example, Miller requires sentencing 
courts to consider evidence of the offender’s “family and home 
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environment.”248  However, it is undecided what type of family 
environment supports a finding that a juvenile acted as a result of 
transient immaturity.  In one Miller sentencing hearing conducted in 
Iowa, the sentencing court cited the fact that the juvenile offender 
had “no family or other support outside of the criminal community” 
as one of the factors warranting a life without parole sentence.249  Yet, 
in another sentencing proceeding conducted in California, the court 
specifically held that the defendant’s family was “not a mitigating 
factor” because he was “raised in a supportive and financially stable 
family.”250  Both evidence of significant familial support and evidence 
of a lack of familial support have been used to support an increased 
sentence.  This highlights the key problem with the Miller factors: 
they fail to provide clear guidance, and, without guidance, a judge can 
construe any facts to support a sentence of life without parole. 
Judges have differing views about what is mitigating and what is 
aggravating and how to weigh such evidence.251  Therefore, 
sentencing decisions will necessarily be inconsistent across courts, 
resulting in arbitrary and unpredictable punishments.  Such a 
subjective sentencing procedure will surely not enable a judge to 
reliably identify the rare incorrigible defender. 
3. Increased Racial Disparities 
The inconsistent imposition of juvenile life without parole will 
inevitably have a significant discriminatory impact on juveniles of 
color, especially African American youth.  Studies conducted prior to 
the Court’s decision in Miller highlight the disproportionate rate at 
which African American juveniles are sentenced to life without 
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parole.  A 2012 study showed that 60% of juveniles sentenced to life 
without parole were African American,252 despite only representing 
about 13% of the United States population.253  A 2005 study showed 
African American juveniles are sentenced to life without parole at a 
rate ten times higher than that of white juvenile offenders.254  
Additionally, the race of the victim is a significant factor in sentencing 
juveniles to life without parole.  Although African American 
juveniles accused of killing a white victim make up only 23.2% of 
juvenile homicide arrests, they comprise 43.4% of juveniles sentenced 
to life without parole.255  Conversely, white offenders accused of 
killing African American victims make up 6.4% of juvenile homicide 
arrests, but only 3.6% of juveniles sentenced to life without parole.256 
The extremely divergent rate at which juveniles of color receive life 
without parole sentences reflects widespread racial discrimination in 
both the charging and sentencing of juvenile homicide offenders.  
What is more, these studies pre-date Miller, when twenty-eight states 
had at least one mandatory juvenile life without parole sentencing 
scheme.257  The added discretion that stems from Miller and 
Montgomery will likely make the disparate racial impact even starker.  
A number of studies have demonstrated that implicit bias affects the 
behavior of those in the justice system, including trial judges.258  
Notably, studies have shown that “implicit biases based on racial 
stereotypes conflate assessments of youth culpability, maturity, 
sophistication, future dangerousness, and severity of punishment.”259  
The very task that trial courts are required to undertake—accurately 
                                                                                                                             
 252. ASHLEY NELLIS, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, THE LIVES OF JUVENILE LIFERS: 
FINDINGS FROM A NATIONAL SURVEY 8 (2012), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/The-Lives-of-Juvenile-Lifers.pdf [https://perma.cc/3JHW-H3
XZ]. 
 253. QuickFacts: Population Estimates, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 1, 2016), 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/table/PST045216/00 [https://perma.cc/888L-V8F6]. 
 254. ALISON PARKER, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AMNESTY INT’L, THE REST OF 
THEIR LIVES: LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 
39 (2005), https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/TheRestofTheirLives.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WHP7-NKMP]. 
 255. NELLIS, supra note 252, at 3. 
 256. Id. 
 257. JOSH ROVNER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, SLOW TO ACT: STATE RESPONSES 
TO 2012 SUPREME COURT MANDATE ON LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE 1 (2014), 
http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Slow-to-Act-State-
Responses-to-Miller.pdf [https://perma.cc/EN48-YFVX]. 
 258. Robin Walker Sterling, “Children Are Different”: Implicit Bias, 
Rehabilitation, and the “New” Juvenile Jurisprudence, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1019, 
1066–67 (2013). 
 259. Id. at 1067. 
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assessing maturity, culpability and future dangerousness—is 
complicated by implicit bias concerning the mitigating nature of youth 
in African American children.260 
Unfortunately, racially biased sentencing on its own will not likely 
provide sufficient reasoning for the Supreme Court to end juvenile 
life without parole.261  However, such disparate sentencing does 
support a finding that the punishment is being dispensed arbitrarily 
rather than reserved for the rare incorrigible offender.  Furthermore, 
state courts should consider the discriminatory impact of juvenile life 
without parole when considering challenges to the constitutionality 
and acceptability of the practice. 
B. A Categorical Ban on Life Without Parole for Juvenile 
Offenders Is the Only Constitutional Option 
Under the current case-by-case approach, sentencers are required 
to make speculative decisions on prospects for rehabilitation, without 
sufficient predictive information to support such a conclusion.  The 
failure of both science and sentencing factors to reliably separate 
irreparable offenders from those whose crimes reflect transient 
immaturity creates an unjustifiably high risk that courts are issuing 
unconstitutional sentences.  This risk illustrates the need for a 
categorical ban. 
The Court in Graham considered taking a case-by-case approach 
by creating a rule that would require courts to take a juvenile 
offender’s age into consideration at sentencing, much like what the 
Miller Court did.262  However, the Court found such an approach 
insufficient to provide adequate constitutional protections.263  The 
Court proceeded to cite five reasons why a categorical ban on juvenile 
life without parole for nonhomicide offenders was necessary.264  Each 
                                                                                                                             
 260. Id. at 1068. See generally Kenneth B. Nunn, The Child as Other: Race and 
Differential Treatment in the Juvenile Justice System, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 679 
(2002). 
 261. However, note that in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), the United 
States Supreme Court held that the racially disproportionate impact of the death 
penalty in Georgia was not enough to violate the constitution, without a showing that 
the Georgia death penalty statute had a racially discriminatory purpose.  Thus, unless 
the Supreme Court wants to overturn McCleskey, the racially discriminatory impact 
of life without parole sentences on juveniles will not alone be sufficient for the 
Supreme Court to create a categorical ban on juvenile life without parole sentences. 
 262. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 76 (2010). 
 263. Id. at 78. 
 264. Id. at 77–79 (confining the case-by-case sentencing approach because: 
(1) cannot identify the incorrigible offenders; (2) high risk of erroneous sentencing; 
(3) differences too large to allow for such a risk; (4) juveniles have impaired criminal 
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of the five reasons cited applies with equal force to life without parole 
for homicide offenders.  Thus, the Court’s reasoning in Graham 
actually illustrates why its current approach in Miller and 
Montgomery is unsatisfactory. 
First, the Graham court explained that a categorical approach was 
necessary because it is impossible to identify the rare incorrigible 
offender.265  The Court explained that even if the court believes a 
juvenile may exhibit sufficient depravity, “it does not follow that 
courts taking a case-by-case proportionality approach could with 
sufficient accuracy distinguish the few incorrigible juvenile offenders 
from the many that have the capacity for change.”266  The Court 
directly questioned a sentencer’s ability to perform the very task it 
mandates in Montgomery. 
Next, the Court held that an “unacceptable likelihood exists that 
the brutality or cold-blooded nature of any particular crime would 
overpower mitigating arguments based on youth.”267  This would 
likely result in juveniles receiving sentences of life without parole, 
despite the fact that their “immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of true 
depravity” require a lesser sentence.268  The Court determined this 
risk of error unacceptable, and further evidence of the need for a 
categorical ban.  As homicide cases are typically more brutal and 
cold-blooded than nonhomicide cases, it stands to reason that the 
same risk of error exists with equal or greater force in homicide cases. 
The Court then explained that “‘[t]he differences between juvenile 
and adult offenders are too marked and well understood to risk 
allowing a youthful person to receive’ a sentence of life without 
parole for a nonhomicide crime ‘despite insufficient culpability.’”269  
Similarly, the Court in Montgomery noted that the vast majority of 
juvenile homicide offenders also have insufficient culpability, and that 
the differences between juveniles and adults are not crime specific.270 
The fourth problem with a case-by-case approach is its failure to 
consider the “special difficulties encountered by counsel in juvenile 
representation,”271 including the fact that juveniles are at “a 
                                                                                                                             
representation; and (5) juveniles should have a chance to demonstrate maturity and 
reform). 
 265. Id. at 77. 
 266. Id. (emphasis added). 
 267. Id. at 78. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. at 78 (citing Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572–73 (2005)).  
 270. Montgomery v. Lousiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 733 (2016).  
 271. Graham, 560 U.S. at 78. 
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significant disadvantage in criminal proceedings.”272  The Court then 
concluded that, “[a] categorical rule avoids the risk that, as a result of 
these difficulties, a court or jury will erroneously conclude that a 
particular juvenile is sufficiently culpable to deserve life without 
parole.”273  Lastly, the Court noted that a categorical approach 
prohibiting life without parole for juvenile nonhomicide offenders 
was the only way to ensure that juveniles are given the opportunity to 
mature and demonstrate reform.274  Neither of these last two factors 
are crime specific.  Undoubtedly, every factor that led the court to 
deem a categorical ban necessary in nonhomicide cases equally 
applies to the sentencing of juvenile homicide offenders to life 
without parole. 
Based on the these factors, the Graham Court ultimately concluded 
that laws “allowing the imposition of these sentences based only on a 
discretionary, subjective judgment by a judge or jury that the offender 
is irredeemably depraved, are insufficient to prevent the possibility 
that the offender will receive a life without parole sentence for which 
he or she lacks the moral culpability.”275 
Miller, as interpreted by Montgomery, established such a 
subjective sentencing scheme, requiring a sentencer to make a 
discretionary judgment that a juvenile is incorrigible.  However, 
Graham already concluded that such subjective determinations, even 
when made after full consideration of youth, are insufficient to shield 
against the high risk of unconstitutional sentencing.276  A categorical 
ban is the only way to adequately protect the rights of the vast 
majority juvenile offenders. 
CONCLUSION 
Montgomery held that only juveniles who are irreparably corrupt 
may be sentenced to life without parole.277  Without reliable guidance 
as to how to distinguish an “irreparably corrupt” juvenile from the 
typical juvenile offender who is capable of rehabilitation, life without 
parole sentences necessarily will be imposed in an unconstitutional 
manner.278  Such reliable guidance is likely impossible, due to the 
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 277. See supra Section I.C. 
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inherently transient nature of the juvenile brain.279  A future parole 
board, with the added knowledge that only comes with time, will be in 
a better position to determine whether or not a juvenile can be 
rehabilitated. 
Based on the conflicting interpretations of Montgomery at the state 
level, the Supreme Court will soon have an opportunity to clarify the 
holdings of Miller and Montgomery.280  It is possible that the Court 
could continue to adopt a case-by-case approach and merely provide 
some clarification on the holdings in Montgomery.  However, if the 
Court genuinely believes that it is unconstitutional to sentence a 
juvenile whose crime reflects transient immaturity to life without 
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APPENDIX A. STATES THAT ALLOW LWOP FOR JUVENILE 
OFFENDERS 
Which states allow juvenile LWOP sentences and which have outlawed the 
practice?1 
States that permit sentencing juveniles to 
LWOP 
States that have eliminated LWOP 
sentences for juvenile offenders 




States that do not 




States where all 
juvenile offenders 
have an opportunity 
for parole 
States that did not 
make the 
elimination of 
LWOP for juveniles 






















New Mexico, New 









Nevada, New Jersey, 
North Dakota, South 
Dakota, Vermont, 
West Virginia, and 
Wyoming 
Colorado, Kentucky, 
Texas, and Utah 
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APPENDIX B. IRREPARABLE CORRUPTION DETERMINATION 
Must a sentencing court find a juvenile to be “irreparably corrupt” prior to 
imposing a life without parole sentence? 
Yes, there must be an explicit finding 
Court Decision Quote(s) 
Arizona Supreme Court State v. Valencia, 386 P.3d 
392, 395 (Ariz. 2016) 
“Arizona law, when Healer and Valencia 
were sentenced, allowed a trial court to 
impose a natural life sentence on a juvenile 
convicted of first degree murder without 
distinguishing crimes that reflected 
‘irreparable corruption’ rather than the 
‘transient immaturity of youth.’” (emphasis 
added) 
Florida Supreme Court Landrum v. State, 192 
So.3d 459, 467–468 (Fla. 
2016) 
“Without this individualized sentencing 
consideration, a sentencer is unable to 
distinguish between juvenile offenders 
whose crimes ‘reflect transient immaturity’ 
and those whose crimes reflect ‘irreparable 
corruption.’ Failing to make this distinction, 
otherwise, would mean life sentences for 
juveniles would not be exceedingly rare, but 
possibly commonplace.” (emphasis added) 
 
“[The court] did not consider whether the 
crime itself reflected ‘transient immaturity’ 
rather than ‘irreparable corruption.’” 
Georgia Supreme Court Veal v. State, 784 S.E.2d 
403, 411 (Ga. 2016) 
“The trial court did not, however, make any 
sort of distinct determination on the record 
that Appellant is irreparably corrupt or 
permanently incorrigible, as necessary to 
put him in the narrow class of juvenile 
murderers for whom an LWOP sentence is 
proportional.” (emphasis added) 
Oklahoma Criminal 
Appeals Court  
(highest court in 
Oklahoma for criminal 
appeals) 
Luna v. State, 387 P.3d 
956, 963 (Okla. Crim. App. 
2016) 
“For the reasons we have discussed, Luna’s 
sentence of life without parole must be 
vacated and the matter remanded for 
resentencing to determine whether the 
crime reflects Luna's transient immaturity, 
or an irreparable corruption and permanent 
incorrigibility warranting the extreme 
sanction of life imprisonment without 
parole.” (emphasis added) 
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Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court 
Commonwealth v. Batts, 
163 A.3d 410, 108–09 (Pa. 
2017) 
“If, after a hearing and consideration of all 
of the evidence presented, the sentencing 
court finds that the Commonwealth has 
satisfied its burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the juvenile is so 
permanently incorrigible that rehabilitation 
of the offender would be impossible, the bar 
against sentencing a juvenile offender to life 
without the possibility of parole is lifted.” 
(emphasis added) 
Iowa Supreme Court 
*The Iowa Supreme Court 
required a finding of 
irreparable corruption 
post-Miller but prior to 
Montgomery. 
State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 
545, 556 (Iowa 2015) 
“The sentencing judge should only sentence 
those juveniles to life in prison without the 
possibility of parole whose crime reflects 
irreparable corruption.” 
State v. Sweet, 879 N.W.2d 
811, 833 (Iowa 2016) 
(interpreting Seats) 
“We noted that if a life sentence without 
parole could ever be imposed on a juvenile 
offender, the burden was on the state to 
show that an individual offender manifested 
‘irreparable corruption.’” (emphasis added) 
California Court of 
Appeals 
*Courts of Appeals are 
split on this issue (see 
below for courts holding 
that a determination of 
irreparable corruption is 
not required).  
**In October of 2017, a 
law was passed that 
effectively ended juvenile 
life without parole in the 
state.  It is unclear whether 
the California Supreme 
Court will hear arguments 
and resolve the split with 
Padilla or consider the 
issue moot.  
Expressly held that 
determination is required: 
People v. Padilla, 209 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 209, 220–21 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2016), appeal 
docketed, 387 P.3d 741 
(Cal. 2017) (requesting 
briefing on whether a trial 
court is required to make 




Implied that determination 
is required: 
In re Berg, 202 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 786 (Cal. Ct. App. 2016) 
“In view of Montgomery, the trial court 
must assess the Miller factors with an eye to 
making an express determination whether 
the juvenile offender’s crime reflects 
permanent incorrigibility arising from 
irreparable corruption.” (Padilla at 673) 
(emphasis added) 
Appellate Court of 
Illinois 
*Appellate Courts are split 
on the issue (see below for 
courts holding that a 
determination of 
irreparable corruption is 
not required).  
**The Illinois Supreme 
Court recently granted 
People v. Nieto, 52 N.E.3d 
442, 455 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2016) 
“The trial court’s findings do not imply that 
it believed defendant was the rarest of 
juveniles whose crime showed that he was 
permanently incorrigible.” (emphasis 
added) 
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review on the issue. See 
People v. Holman, 60 
N.E.3d 878 (Ill. 2016). 
Court of Appeals of 
Michigan 
People v. Hyatt, 891 
N.W.2d 549, 552 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 2016) 
“The United States Supreme Court has 
made unmistakably clear, it is only the truly 
rare juvenile who will be deserving of the 
harshest penalty available under the laws of 
this state, and a life-without-parole sentence 
is an unconstitutional penalty for all 
juveniles but those whose crimes reflect 
irreparable corruption. For this reason, 
while we conclude that a judge, not a jury, is 
to make this determination.” 
No, a sentencing court is not required to find a juvenile “irreparably corrupt” prior to 
imposing an LWOP sentence 
Court Decision Quote(s) 
Virginia Supreme Court Jones v. Commonwealth, 
795 S.E.2d 705 (Va. 2017) 
Holding that Miller merely requires that a 
defendant have an opportunity to present 
mitigation, and that judges do not in fact 
have to consider it. 
Washington Supreme 
Court 
State v. Ramos, 387 P.3d 
650, 659 (Wash. 2017) 
“It also does not require the sentencing 
court . . . to make an explicit finding that the 
offense reflects irreparable corruption on 
the part of the juvenile.” 
Tennessee Court of 
Appeals 
Brown v. State, No. 
W2015-00887-CCA-R3-
PC, 2016 WL 1562981, at 
*7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 
15, 2016), appeal denied 
(Aug. 19, 2016), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 1331 
(2017) 
“As indicated, the Court reiterated that 
‘Miller did not require trial courts to make a 
finding of fact regarding a child’s 
incorrigibility’ but only required ‘[a] hearing 
where ‘youth and its attendant 
characteristics’ are considered as sentencing 
factors . . . to separate those juveniles who 
may be sentenced to life without parole 
from those who may not.’” 
California Court of 
Appeals 
*Courts of Appeals are 
split on this issue (see 
above for courts holding 
that a determination of 
irreparable corruption is 
required).  
**In October of 2017, a 
law was passed that 
effectively ended juvenile 
life without parole in the 
People v. Blackwell, 207 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 444, 462 
(2016) 
 
People v. Willover, 203 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 384 (2016) 
“Once such a juvenile offender has been 
convicted of first degree murder and one or 
more special circumstances has been found 
true beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
sentencing court need not find any 
particular fact before imposing 
LWOP . . . As the People put it, ‘irreparable 
corruption’ is not a factual finding, but 
merely ‘encapsulates the [absence] of youth-
based mitigation.’” (Blackwell, 462) 
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state.  It is unclear whether 
the California Supreme 
Court will hear arguments 
and resolve the split with 
Padilla or consider the 
issue moot. 
Appellate Court of 
Illinois 
*Appellate Courts are split 
on the issue (see above for 
the Illinois court’s holding 
that a determination of 
irreparable corruption is 
required).  
**The Illinois Supreme 
Court recently granted 
review on the issue. See 
People v. Holman, 60 
N.E.3d 878 (Ill. 2016). 
People v. Stafford, 61 
N.E.3d 1058, 1068–69 (Ill. 
Ct. App, 2016) 
 
People v. Holman, 58 
N.E.3d 632, appeal 
docketed, 60 N.E.3d 878 
(Ill. 2016) 
“Although the trial court did not explicitly 
state defendant was one of the rarest of 
juvenile offenders whose crime showed a 
life sentence is appropriate, the court’s 
reasoning certainly conveys the same 
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APPENDIX C. DISCRETIONARY VS. MANDATORY SENTENCES 
Do Miller and Montgomery apply to discretionary LWOP sentences, or just 
to mandatory LWOP sentences? 
Miller and Montgomery apply to 
discretionary LWOP sentences 
Miller and Montgomery apply ONLY to 
mandatory LWOP sentences 
State Supreme Court Decisions B 
Arizona Supreme Court 
State v. Valencia, 386 P.3d 392 (Ariz. 2016) 
Arkansas Supreme Court*A 
Brown v. Hobbs, 2014 Ark. 267 (2014) 
California Supreme Court* 
People v. Gutierrez, 324 P.3d 245(Cal. 2014) 
Indiana Supreme Court*A 
Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864 (Ind. 2012) 
Connecticut Supreme Court*C 
State v. Riley, 315 Conn. 637 (2015) 
Minnesota Supreme Court*C 
State v. Williams, 862 N.W.2d 701 (Minn. 
2015) 
Florida Supreme Court 
Atwell v. State, 197 So.3d 1040 (Fla. 2016) 
Missouri Supreme Court 
State v. Nathan, 522 S.W.3d 881 (Mo. 2017) 
Georgia Supreme Court 
Dennis v. State, 300 Ga. 457 (2017) 
South Dakota Supreme CourtC 
State v. Charles, 892 N.W.2d 915 (S.D. 2017) 
Iowa Supreme Court* 
State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545 (Iowa 2015) 
Virginia Supreme Court 
Jones v. Commonwealth, 795 S.E.2d 705  
(Va. 2017) 
Montana Supreme Court* 
Beach v. State, 379 Mont. 74, 86 (2015) 
Nevada Supreme Court*A 
Randell v. State, No. 61232, 2013 WL 
7158872 (Nev. Dec. 12, 2013) 
New Jersey Supreme CourtC 
State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422 (2017) 
West Virginia Supreme Court*A 
State v. Redman, No. 13-0225, 2014 WL 
1272553 (W.Va. Mar. 28, 2014) 
Oklahoma Criminal Appeals Court 
Luna v. State, 387 P.3d. 956 (Okla. Crim. 
App. 2016) 
 
Ohio Supreme Court* 
State v. Long, 138 Ohio.St.3d 478 (2014) 
South Carolina Supreme Court* 
Aiken v. Byars, 410 S.C. 534 (2014) 
Washington Supreme Court 
State v. Ramos, 387 P.3d 650 (Wash. 2017) 
* Case decided before Montgomery v. Louisiana.  
A Following this decision, this state eliminated LWOP as a possible punishment for juvenile offenders.  
B Kentucky does not permit juvenile LWOP sentences, but it has not made the elimination retroactive.  
C Court interpreting Miller and Montgomery’s mandates with “de facto” or “effective” LWOP sentences. 
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APPENDIX D. DE FACTO LWOP SENTENCES 
Do Miller (and Graham) apply to lengthy “de facto” LWOP sentences? 
State Supreme Court cases holding that a lengthy sentence is a de facto life 
sentence
Miller applies to de facto LWOP sentences 
Court Quote/Holding 
California Supreme Court 
People v. Franklin, 370 P.3d 
1053, 1059 (Cal. 2016) 
“We now hold that just as Graham applies to sentences that are 
the ‘functional equivalent of life without parole sentence,’ so too 
does Miller apply to such functionally equivalent sentences.” 
Connecticut Supreme Court 
Casiano v. Comm’r of Corr., 115 
A.3d 1031, 1048 (Conn. 2015) 
“We are nonetheless persuaded that the procedures set forth in 
Miller must be followed when considering whether to sentence a 
juvenile offender to fifty years imprisonment without parole.” 
Illinois Supreme Court 
People v. Reyes, 63 N.E.3d 884, 
888 (Ill. 2016) 
“[T]he sentencing scheme mandated that he remain in prison 
until at least the age of 105 . . . [u]nquestionably, then, under the 
circumstances, defendant’s term-of-years sentence is a 
mandatory, de facto life-without-parole sentence. We therefore 
vacate defendant’s sentence as unconstitutional pursuant to 
Miller.” 
Indiana Supreme Court 
Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 8 
(Ind. 2014) 
“Similar to a life without parole sentence, Brown's 150 year 
sentence ‘forswears altogether the rehabilitative ideal.’” 
Iowa Supreme Court 
State v. Null, 836 N.W.2d 41, 71 
(Iowa 2013) 
“A threshold question is whether a 52.5–year minimum prison 
term for a juvenile based on the aggregation of mandatory 
minimum sentences for second-degree murder and first-degree 
robbery triggers the protections to be afforded under Miller—
namely, an individualized sentencing hearing to determine the 
issue of parole eligibility. We think it does.” 
New Jersey Supreme Court 
State v. Zuber, 152 A.3d 197, 
212–13 (N.J. 2017) 
“The term-of-years sentences in these appeals—a minimum of 55 
years’ imprisonment for Zuber and 68 years and 3 months for 
Comer—are not officially ‘life without parole.’ But we find that 
the lengthy term-of-years sentences imposed on the juveniles in 
these cases are sufficient to trigger the protections of Miller 
under the Federal and State Constitutions.” 
Washington Supreme Court 
State v. Ramos, 387 P.3d 650, 
659 (2017) 
“Miller applies equally to literal and de facto life-without-parole 
sentences[,]” and “it is undisputed that Ramos’ 85-year aggregate 
sentence is a de facto life sentence.” 
Wyoming Supreme Court 
Bear Cloud v. State, 334 P.3d 
132, 144 (Wyo. 2014) 
Aggregate sentence of just over 45 years was de facto equivalent 
of life sentence without parole.  
“The United States Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence requires that a process be followed before we 
make the judgment that juvenile ‘offenders never will be fit to 
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reenter society.’  That process must be applied to the entire 
sentencing package, when the sentence is life without parole, or 
when aggregate sentences result in the functional equivalent of 
life without parole.”  
Using similar reasoning, cases that held Graham applicable to de facto LWOP 
sentences 
Florida Supreme Court 
Henry v. State, 175 So. 3d 675, 
679–80 (Fla. 2016) 
“Because Henry’s aggregate sentence, which totals ninety years 
and requires him to be imprisoned until he is at least nearly 
ninety-five years old, does not afford him this opportunity [of 
release], that sentence is unconstitutional under Graham.” 
Louisiana Supreme Court* 
State ex rel. Morgan v. State, 
217 So. 3d 266, 271 (La. 2016) 
 
*The Louisiana Supreme Court held 
that a lengthy sentence for ONE 
crime can be a de facto life sentence, 
but that lengthy aggregate sentences 
do not violate Graham (see below). 
“Defendant’s 99-year sentence [without parole] [w]as an effective 
life sentence, illegal under Graham.”  
Nevada Supreme Court 
State v. Boston, 383 P.3d 453, 
458 (Nev. 2015) 
“Boston’s aggregate sentences [for nonhomicide crimes], which 
require him to serve approximately 100 years before being 
eligible for parole, are without a doubt the functional equivalent 
of a sentence of life without the possibility of parole.”  
Ohio Supreme Court 
State v. Moore, 76 N.E.3d 1127, 
¶ 59, at 1139 (Ohio 2016) 
“We see no significant difference between a sentence of life 
imprisonment without parole and a term-of-years prison sentence 
that would extend beyond the defendant’s expected lifespan 
before the possibility of parole.” 
State Supreme Court cases holding that a lengthy sentence is not a de facto 
LWOP sentence 
Miller and/or Graham do not apply to lengthy aggregate sentences 
Louisiana Supreme Court 
State v. Brown, 118 So. 3d 332, 
341 (La. 2013) 
“In our view, Graham does not prohibit consecutive term of year 
sentences for multiple offenses committed while a defendant was 
under the age of 18, even if they might exceed a defendant’s 
lifetime.”  
Georgia Supreme Court 
Adams v. State, 707 S.E.2d 359, 
365 (Ga. 2011) 
“Clearly, ‘[n]othing in the Court’s opinion [Graham] affects the 
imposition of a sentence to a term of years without the possibility 
of parole.’”  
Nebraska Supreme Court* 
State v. Garza, 888 N.W.2d 526, 
535–36 (2016) 
 
*In another case the Nebraska 
Supreme Court in analyzing a 
lengthy sentence under Graham 
“We conclude that Garza’s characterization of his sentence as a 
de facto life sentence is immaterial to our analysis of whether his 
sentence is excessive.”  
“Both Miller and Tatum dealt with juvenile defendants who had 
been sentenced, or resentenced, to life imprisonment without 
parole for murder.  Garza, in contrast, was resentenced to a term 
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implied that a lengthy sentence 
could equate to life without parole. 
State v. Smith, 295 Neb. 957 (2017). 
of years and is eligible for parole . . . [therefore] we find no merit 
to his argument that the sentencing court was required by Miller 
or Tatum to make a specific finding of ‘irreparable corruption.’”  
Virginia Supreme Court 
Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 781 
S.E.2d 920, 925 (Va. 2016) 
“[Defendants] argue only that we should expand Graham’s 
prohibition of life-without-parole sentences to non-life sentences 
that, when aggregated, exceed the normal life spans of juvenile 
offenders.  For several reasons, we decline the invitation to do 
so.” 
Although Miller or Graham  might apply to some lengthy sentences, the court found 
that the specific length at issue was not a de facto LWOP sentence 
Delaware Supreme Court 
Walker v. State, No. 430, 2016, 
2017 WL 443724, at *1 (Del. Jan. 
17, 2017) 
“Although it may be that the imposition of a specific sentence of 
years to a minor in a specific case could be deemed the 
equivalent of a life sentence that the Supreme Court could not 
logically distinguish from its holding in the trilogy of cases noted 
earlier, this is not such case.  At the time of his heinous crime, 
Walker was just shy of the age of majority.  Life expectancy in 
the United States is now 78.8 years, which is over a decade 
beyond when Walker would be eligible for release.” 
Nebraska Supreme Court*  
State v. Smith, 892 N.W.2d 52, 
64 (Neb. 2017) 
 
*Nebraska’s caselaw interpreting de 
facto life sentences in homicide cases 
is confusing—it is unclear if the 
court finds Miller applicable. See 
State v. Garza, 888 N.W.2d 526 
(Neb. 2016). 
“Here, the presentence report supports that the average life 
expectancy for someone Smith’s age is 78.8 years, and as 
discussed above, Smith is eligible for release at 62 years of age. 
Accordingly, Smith’s sentence of 90 years to life imprisonment 
allows for parole eligibility almost 17 years before his average life 
expectancy.” 
South Dakota Supreme Court 
State v. Charles, 892 N.W.2d 
915, ¶ 16, at 921 (S.D. 2017) 
“A life sentence is commonly understood to mean spending the 
rest of one’s life in prison.  This is not to say that a sentence to a 
term of years for a juvenile homicide offender will always pass 
constitutional muster.  For example, ‘term sentences virtually 
guaranteeing an offender will die in prison without meaningful 
opportunity for release could be considered a life sentence for 
the purpose of applying Graham or Miller.’  Because Charles has 
the opportunity for release at age 60, his sentence does not 
‘guarantee[ ] he will die in prison without any meaningful 
opportunity to obtain release.’” (internal citations omitted) 
Virginia Supreme Court 
Johnson v. Commonwealth, 793 
S.E.2d 326, 331 (Va. 2016) 
“The possibility of geriatric release under Code § 53.1-40.01 
provides a meaningful opportunity for release that is akin to 
parole.”  
Because of the possibility of geriatric release, no term of years, 
no matter how lengthy, is a “de facto” life sentence. 
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APPENDIX E. PRESUMPTION AGAINST LWOP 
Is there a presumption against LWOP and/or is the burden on the state to 
show that a juvenile deserves LWOP? 
State Supreme Court says YES State Supreme Court says NO 
Parole is the presumed sentence and/or 
the burden falls on the state to prove the 
youth is eligible for LWOP 
LWOP is the presumed sentence and/or 
the burden falls on the juvenile 
defendant to prove that s/he is ineligible 
for an LWOP sentence 
Connecticut Supreme Court 
State v. Riley, 110 A.3d 1205, 1214 (2015) 
(presumption in favor of parole) 
Arizona Supreme Court 
See State v. Valencia, 386 P.3d 392, 396 
(Ariz. 2016) (at re-sentencing, the burden is 
on defendants to show that they are 
ineligible for LWOP) 
Indiana Supreme Court 
Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 871 (Ind. 
2012) (burden on state to prove LWOP 
appropriate) 
Virginia Supreme Court 
Jones v. Commonwealth, 795 S.E.2d 705, 715 
(Va. 2017) (burden is on defendants to show 
that they are ineligible for LWOP) 
Iowa Supreme Court 
State v. Seats, 865 N.W.2d 545, 555 (Iowa 
2015) (presumption in favor of parole) 
Washington Supreme Court 
State v. Ramos, 387 P.3d 650, 663 (Wash. 
2017) (Washington Sentencing Reform Act 
places burden of proof on juvenile defendant 
to show by preponderance of evidence that 
he or she should receive lower sentence) 
Missouri Supreme Court 
State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232, 241 (Mo. 2013) 
(burden on state to show LWOP is 
appropriate) 
There is no presumption in favor of 
either sentence1 
Utah Supreme Court 
State v. Houston, 353 P.3d 55, 83 (Utah 2015) 
(presumption in favor of parole) 
 
Nebraska Supreme Court 
State v. Mantich, 888 N.W.2d 376, 384 (2016) 
(no presumption against LWOP) 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410, 433 
(Pa. 2017) (presumption against LWOP and 
burden on state to show juvenile is incapable 
of rehabilitation) 
Review of this issue granted by the State Supreme Court 
The following courts have granted review to determine whether there needs to be a 
presumption against juvenile LWOP at sentencing. 
California Supreme Court 
See News Release, Sup. Ct. of Cal., Summary of Cases Accepted and Related Actions During 
Week of January 23, 2017 (Jan. 27, 2017), www.courts.ca.gov/documents/ws012317.pdf 
2017] CONFUSION IN MONTGOMERY'S WAKE 199 
[https://perma.cc/859S-EB4D] (providing statement of the issue in People v. Arzate, No. 
B259259, 2016 WL 5462821, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 29, 2016)). 
North Carolina Supreme Court 
State v. James, 796 S.E.2d 6 (N.C. 2017) 
 
In State v. James, 786 S.E.2d 73 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016), the North Carolina Court of Appeals 
held that the North Carolina sentencing statute creates a presumption in favor of LWOP for 
juveniles, and that this is in compliance with Miller.  The North Carolina Supreme Court 
granted review of this decision on March 16, 2017. 
1 If a state allows for juvenile LWOP sentences, but is not listed on this table, it means that their Supreme 
Court has yet to determine if Miller or Montgomery creates a presumption against LWOP.  Since their 
sentencing statues do not establish a presumption in favor of either sentence, these states should be 
considered to fall in the “no presumption in favor of either sentence” category. 
 
